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Sustainable Secure Management against APT 
Attacks for Intelligent Embedded-Enabled 
Smart Manufacturing 
Jun Wu, Mianxiong Dong, Kaoru Ota, Member, IEEE, Jianhua Li and Wu Yang 
Abstract—Intelligent embedded-enable smart manufacturing is an important infrastructure for future industries. Increasing security 
threats are disturbing the normal operations of smart manufacturing. As a novel type of threat, an advanced persistent threat (APT) has 
the novel features of strong concealment, latency and long-term entanglement, which can penetrate the core systems of smart 
manufacturing, especially for intelligent embedded systems, and cause great destruction from the cyber side to physical side. However, 
the existing security schemes cannot provide sustainable resource management, which causes the core system in smart manufacturing 
not to perform sustainable secure detection and defense against APTs. To address this challenge, this paper proposes a sustainable 
secure management mechanism for smart manufacturing against APTs. The proposed mechanism includes two parts: sustainable threat 
intelligence analysis and sustainable secure resource management. Sustainable threat intelligence analysis provides sustainable 
discovery of the indications of potential APTs , which has features of a weak signal, low correlation and slow time variation. The 
sustainable secure resource management provides deep and continuous protection for intelligent embedded systems in smart 
manufacturing. The evaluations show the defense capabilities and the feasibility of the proposed mechanism. 
Index Terms—Smart manufacturing, sustainable security, resource management, advanced persistent threat (APT).  
——————————      —————————— 
1 INTRODUCTION
Smart manufacturing is currently an important devel-
opmental trend for future industries, especially future 
manufacturing [1][2]. In smart manufacturing, industrial 
control and automation systems play important roles and 
improve the intelligence and efficiency of the power con-
trol, transportation, water supply, etc. Many advanced 
computing and networking technologies can be intro-
duced into smart manufacturing to improve the efficiency 
and performance, such as software-defined networking 
(SDN), information-centric networking (ICN), and fog 
computing [3][4][5][6]. Artificial intelligence is also a 
promising technology to optimize the performance of 
smart manufacturing [7][8][9]. As a core component of 
smart manufacturing, the intelligent embedded system in 
industrial automation systems is the basic infrastructure 
to implement advanced computing and networking tech-
nologies. Cyber security is also a very important issue for 
smart manufacturing[10][11][12]. The intelligent embed-
ded systems in smart manufacturing are often deployed 
in potentially adverse or even hostile environments, from 
which an attacker can generate all types of threats and 
attacks. These threats can cause great impacts and disrupt 
the normal running of resources of the embedded sys-
tems in smart manufacturing, such as user processes, ker-
nels, industrial I/O, etc. Furthermore, an advanced persis-
tent threat (APT) [13][14], which is a novel kind of attack, 
can target smart manufacturing and cause great destruc-
tion. Different from traditional threats, an APT is a set of 
stealthy and continuous cyber hacking processes, often 
orchestrated by a single attacker or a specific entity. An 
APT usually targets either private organizations, states or 
both for business or political motives. APT processes re-
quire a high degree of covertness over a long period of 
time. APT defense is an unresolved problem in smart 
manufacturing. 
 Figure 1 provides the conceptual architecture and 
work principal of smart manufacturing. As shown in Fig. 
1, the service components of smart manufacturing include 
service networks, smart logistics, smart products, and the 
sensing and control infrastructure. All the data and con-
trol flows in smart manufacturing are processed by the 
functional components of manufacturing data and intelli-
gence processing, intelligent embedded systems, and 
smart manufacturing applications. The data flows are the 
status date from the service-layer, such as the data from 
the logistics and supply chain, which can provide the in-
put for smart analysis and decisions. Moreover, the con-
trol flows are the commands from the managers, which 
can insert human-decision into the smart manufacturing. 
Manufacturing data and intelligence processing can ena-
ble intelligent decisions in complex environments based 
on smart logistics and products, which can enhance the 
efficiency and capacity from products to markets. Intelli-
gent embedded systems are the carriers of all the smart 
and normal processing of data and services, which is the 
core component of smart manufacturing. Based on intelli-
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gent embedded systems, smart manufacturing applica-
tions can be implemented and directly provide smart ser-
vices for users. When facing an APT, the intelligent em-
bedded system is the most vulnerable of the aforemen-
tioned components of smart manufacturing. In many ex-
isting APTs in smart industry including smart manufac-
turing, such as Stuxnet [15], the intelligent embedded 
system is the main target. By interfering with the intelli-
gent embedded system, an attack chain can be generated. 
Therefore, it is very important to provide sustainable se-
cure protection for intelligent systems again an APT in 
smart manufacturing. 
 
In the current smart industry, especially smart manu-
facturing, Linux-based open-source operating systems, 
especially Real-Time Application Interface (RTAI)-Linux, 
have been widely applied in manufacturing industry sys-
tems [17]. Currently, increasing threats are capable of dis-
turbing the normal function of an industrial automation 
system because many sophisticated attacks can masquer-
ade as legitimate applications or services to destroy the 
resources of RTAI-Linux, such as user processes, the ker-
nel, and industrial I/O. There have been some works that 
focused on the security of embedded systems[18], [19] 
[20], [21], [22], [23]. However, these works just studied 
single points of the security in embedded systems, includ-
ing the security of the code, memory, processor, etc. 
These existing schemes cannot provide sustainable re-
source management against APTs, which means that the 
software and hardware of the smart devices in industry 
cannot perform sustainable security detection and de-
fense against sophisticated threats. Therefore, it is still an 
open issue to propose a global security framework for the 
resource management of intelligent embedded systems. 
To address the above challenges, this paper proposes a 
sustainable secure management mechanism for smart 
manufacturing. There are two main contributions in this 
paper. First, this paper introduce threat intelligent analy-
sis into smart manufacturing to detection APTs with 
strong concealment, latency and long-term entanglement. 
Second, a secure management approach is proposed to 
implement the sustainable secure resource management 
and provide deep and continuous protection. The rest of 
the paper is organized as follows: In Sect. 2, the prelimi-
naries and basic idea are presented, and related works are 
analyzed in Sect. 3. The details of the sustainable threat 
intelligence analysis and secure resource management are 
given in Sect. 4 and Sect. 5, respectively. Sect. 6 presents 
evaluations. Finally, Sect. 7 concludes this paper. 
2 PRELIMINARIES AND BASIC IDEA 
2.1 Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) 
An APT is a kind of novel and sophisticated attack that is 
often started by directly targeting a few power users with 
malicious software [13]. The APT then propagates itself 
by exploiting flaws in applications deployed across the 
systems of key infrastructures including smart manufac-
turing, the power grid, or the water supply. When facing 
APTs, all networks are untrusted and the traditional se-
cure defense components are no longer in force because 
of the strong concealment, latency, and long-term entan-
glement. Through penetrating the cyber systems of the 
key infrastructure, an APT can destroy a physical system. 
Some existing APTs, such as Stuxnet[15] and Duqu[16], 
have already caused great destruction in smart energy, 
manufacturing, and water systems. The embedded sys-
tem is the most vulnerable attack point for the APT. Cur-
rently, the development of a systemic secure framework 
against APTs is still an open issue.  
2.2 Intelligent Embedded Systems 
Real-time application interface (RTAI) provides a real-
time approach based on Linux [24]. RTAI defines a real-
time hardware abstraction layer (RTHAL) on Linux that 
provides a set of program interfaces for the necessary 
modifications on Linux. Therefore, RTAI just needs to 
communicate with the program interfaces. RTAI can re-
duce the modifications to the codes in the Linux kernel.  
The basic architecture of the RTAI-Linux-based intelli-
gent embedded system is shown in Fig. 2. In this paper, 
we take RTAI-Linux as a typical example of an intelligent 
embedded system for study. 
2.3 Requirements of Secure Resource Management 
In smart manufacturing, intelligent embedded systems 
can control the resources of an industrial automation sys-
tem, including the user process module, application 
module, control progress, communication module, clock 
module, etc. Based on cooperation among the resources in 
the industrial embedded systems, a smart control capabil-
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Fig. 2. RTAI-Linux-based intelligent architecture and the security re-
quirements.  
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the sustainable secure management of the resources in 
intelligent embedded systems is lacking in current smart 
manufacturing, which will cause vulnerabilities into the 
intelligent embedded systems in smart manufacturing. 
Because intelligent the embedded system is the most criti-
cal infrastructure of smart manufacturing, the normal 
work flow can be disturbed once security threats occur. 
First, to defend against APTs, an efficient and sustainable 
threat intelligence analysis approach is necessary to de-
tect the potential threat clues. Second, the software and 
hardware of intelligent embedded systems must form a 
sustainable and cooperative defense architecture. When 
the threat propagates from one module to another, the 
secure management mechanism should stop the propaga-
tion and control the destruction. These requirements are 
still open issues in smart manufacturing.  
2.4 Basic Idea 
To improve the secure defense capability against APTs in 
smart manufacturing, this paper proposes a sustainable 
secure management mechanism. The proposed sustaina-
ble secure management mechanism includes two parts: 
sustainable threat intelligence analysis and sustainable 
secure resource management. APT intelligence analysis 
provides the sustainable discovery of the potential APT 
clues, which have the features of a weak signal, low corre-
lation and slow time variation. Moreover, the sustainable 
secure resource management provides deep and continu-
ous protection for the software and hardware of the intel-
ligent embedded systems in smart manufacturing. The 
APT intelligence analysis and sustainable secure man-
agement form a seamless loop, which is shown in Fig. 3. 
3 RELATED WORKS 
3.1 Embedded Systems in Smart Applications 
Real-time Linux-based embedded systems for smart in-
dustry including smart manufacturing have attracted 
much attention.  
The application of Ethernet Powerlink for communica-
tion in a computerized numerical control (CNC) system 
using Linux was presented by Krystian Erwinski et al. 
[24]. In this work, the necessary modifications to the 
Linux configuration, Ethernet Powerlink (EPL) stack, 
computer basic I/O system, etc. were studied in depth. As 
the next revolution in embedded-system development, a 
model-driven engineering (MDE)-based framework was 
used by George Doukas et al. as a control and automation 
system using real-time Linux [25]. A. Barbalace consid-
ered the Linux IP stack and RTnet, an open-source hard 
real-time network protocol for Xenomai and RTAI, which 
verified that real-time Linux is feasible to replace 
VxWorks [26]. Keith G. Erickson analyzed the National 
Spherical Torus Experiment Upgrade (NSTX-U) advances 
in real-time C++11 on Linux [27]. NSTX-U was proposed 
by the Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory to satisfy the 
needs of fusion devices in industrial automation systems. 
To realize predictable industrial embedded systems, Mi-
kael Asberg et al. proposed a fast Linux bootup based 
nonintrusive scheme [28]. In this work, the Linux kernel is 
the unmodified Linux kernel, and predictability and reli-
ability are achieved by a nonpatched real-time scheduler 
module. Praween Amontamavut et al. proposed a sepa-
rate Linux process logging model for embedded systems 
[29] that can be used to log the behavior of Linux process-
es in Android. To capture the traffic from a large number 
of CAN buses in industrial automation systems, Michal 
Sojka et al. studied in depth the performance evaluation 
of Linux CAN-related system calls [30]. For cooperative 
retransmission, Vitalik Nikolyenko et al. focused on the 
implementation and evaluation of a SoftMAC-based 
Linux kernel module [31], which reduced the overhead 
due to block acknowledgment. This work shows the pos-
sibility of cooperative retransmission achieving even 
greater performance improvements at 802.11n rates. In 
fact, 802.11n is often used to establish the wireless net-
works in smart cities, so this work is significant for wire-
less industrial automation systems in smart cities. 
3.2 Security Technologies for Embedded Systems  
To enhance the security level of the intelligent embedded 
systems, a number of schemes have been proposed to 
defend against traditional security threats. 
To secure the Linux containers and their workloads, 
the automatic construction of rules describing the ex-
pected activities of containers is used in [18]. To establish 
a secure and reliable embedded system based on open 
source software, a security assurance development pro-
cess was proposed for building a reliable Linux-based 
operating system [19]. In a previous work, a layered and 
componentized security architecture for Linux was pro-
posed that divides the security module into individual 
components, and thus high cohesion and low coupling 
can be achieved. However, the existing security harden-
ing mechanisms protect specific applications and are not 
designed to protect entire environments such as those 
inside the containers. A new lightweight compact encryp-
tion system was proposed based on bit permutation in-
struction group operation (GRP) that satisfies the re-
source-strained environment in the present industry [20]. 
Moreover, there have been some existing works focusing 
on coding security. For example, a security coding 
scheme was proposed for an embedded system that com-
bines rate splitting, superposition coding, nested binning, 
and channel prefixing. This coding scheme can produce a 
secrecy capacity region for the channel in several scenari-
os. The works in [22] and [23] focused on the virus detec-
tion and hardware security problems of embedded sys-
tems, respectively. In addition, there have been works 










Fig. 3. Basic idea of sustainable secure management.  
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that focus on the security of the control networks of vari-
ous industrial systems [32], [33], [34]. Although these ap-
proaches can enhance the security of embedded systems, 
most of these works only defend against traditional 
threats but do not provide sustainable protection. A sus-
tainable secure defense approach for secure resource 
management is still an unresolved problem in smart 
manufacturing. 
3.3 Threat Intelligence Analysis  
Threat intelligence analysis is a novel secure technology 
that can provide predictions and alarms for threats. 
Threat intelligence analysis has also attracted much atten-
tion.  
A threat intelligence scheme was proposed for safe-
guarding Industry 4.0 systems [35]. The proposed threat 
intelligence approach is based on beta mixture-hidden 
Markov models (MHMMs) for detecting anomalous activ-
ities against both the cyber and physical sides of Industry 
4.0. A smart management module and a threat intelli-
gence module are included in the proposed intelligence 
scheme. Moreover, an intelligence-driven security-aware 
defense mechanism was proposed [36]. In this mecha-
nism, a risk admission control policy was first designed to 
accommodate the risk tolerance and response capacity of 
the hosts. Then, the defense control policy was designed 
on two-stage decisions, involving proportional fair re-
source allocation and host-attack assignment, which can 
address the multiple attacker resources. Additionally, a 
distributed auction-based assignment algorithm was de-
signed to capture the uncertainty in the number of re-
solved attacks. In addition, an intelligence analysis ap-
proach was proposed to detect malicious analysts who 
attempt to manipulate decision makers’ perceptions 
through their intelligence reports [37]. To detect abnormal 
behaviors, a psychological indicator with user-modeling 
techniques is used in this scheme. Some important fac-
tors, such as Time Series and contents can also be used as 
threat intelligence elements [38][39]. Although there are 
some existing threat intelligence analysis schemes, it is 
still an open issue to propose a specific intelligence analy-
sis model to address an APT with strong concealment, 
latency and long-term entanglement.  
4 SUSTAINABLE THREAT INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS 
4.1 Threat Intelligence Driven APT Discovery 
Intelligence analysis with respect to potential threats to 
the intelligent grid is the basis for an efficient defense. 
The reason that an APT is difficult to discover is because 
the APT is very insidious. The framework of the APT in-
telligence analysis is shown in Fig. 4. 
As shown in Fig. 4, the threats related to the APT 
shares the characteristics of a weak signal, low correlation 
and low frequency, so that the regular methods of detect-
ing the threats do not work at all. This topic uses the con-
cept of threat intelligence to perform a threat correlation 
analysis in an industrial communicating network. In par-
ticular, it focuses on weak signals with a weak correlation 
and a low frequency.  
4.2 Weak Signal Threat Intelligence Integration and 
Restoration 
Weak signals are predictive, vague and fragmentary sym-
bols that have various forms and origins. In threat intelli-
gence, a weak signal has such characteristics as an abun-
dant form, low intelligence integrity, low information 
relevance and practicability, and low value of independ-
ence. However, a weak signal also contains a great deal of 
useful content for an APT analysis that have generally 
been ignored in previous defense methods. In this paper, 
the process of capturing weak signals is based on an anal-
ysis of the industrial communication network environ-
ment. The weakly concealed threat intelligence is clus-
tered according to the business rules of industrial control 
communication, and those signals are used as inputs for 
multiscale symbol sequence entropy calculation, fragment 
correlation analysis and scenario analysis. Then, based on 
the industrial communication theme jigsaw puzzle and 
dynamic time-varying processing, we could achieve a 
restoration from weak signal information fragments to 
the full APT threat.  
4.3 Low-Correlation Threat Intelligence Analysis  
One of the characteristics of the smart grid APT is that the 
elements of its threat situation are of low relevance to the 
network elements, and a set of methods is needed to ana-
lyze the low correlation of the potential threat elements. 
This approach requires identifying and removing extra-
neous or redundant features from a set of feature attrib-
utes, and correlation-based feature selection (CFS) can be 
used to implement this process. For an APT, it cannot be 
completely determined that a certain feature variable is 
irrelevant by analyzing the known sample data, so it still 
needs to be considered for the unselected low-relevance 
threat information. As shown in Fig. 5, based on the deci-
sion tree method, this topic chooses the information gain 
ratio of each eigenvalue when selecting the threat intelli-
gence features and weights the information gain ratio of 
the eigenvalues in the set of optimal eigenvalues w. 
The correlation coefficient between the two threat in-
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Fig. 4. Framework of sustainable threat intelligence analysis. 
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verse attribute of one attribute value in the threat intelli-
gence, and b represents the consecutive attribute values of 
the threat intelligence. The attribute with the smallest 
mean correlation is selected to obtain the set of low-
correlation features. Then, using opportunity discovery 
theory, we apply a unified map of the attributes of the 
threat intelligence features mapped to the weights. Thus, 





4.4 Analysis of Slow Time-Varying Threat Intelligence  
In smart manufacturing, the randomness and dynamism 
of the slow time-varying parameters associated with APT 
and the limitations of obtaining information from slowly 
time-varying objects are among the major causes of the 
difficulty of discovering APTs. This section will study this 
issue. Sparse approximation is a kind of analysis method 
applied to long-term observation data for event detection. 
In this paper, dynamic principal component analysis 
(PCA) is used to realize the sparse approximation analysis 
of slow time-varying threat information. In the time-
domain data of the threat intelligence, additional time-
varying parameters should also be introduced into the 
intelligence analysis. It is assumed that the one-
dimensional time series data from the threat intelligence 
in (k) is denoted as {in (1), in (2),..., in (N)} and N is the 
observation point. The data matrix constructed for further 








In Eq. (2), t is the time interval, which is set according 
to the actual situation in the application. After obtaining 
Eq. (2), the principal component analysis of the covari-
ance matrix of IN is used to calculate the eigenvalues to 
evaluate the dynamics of the random process in(k). On 
this basis, adding a nonoverlapping moving time window 
can improve its analytical performance. In this way, the 
threat intelligence data Oin observed in in(k) can be calcu-
lated according to Eq. (3). Here, N=qt, and q is the number 
of transition time windows of in(k), each with a length of 
t. Then, we obtain the result of the sparse approximation 
analysis of slow time-varying threat information data 
through a combination of a few pivot elements. 
In addition, we use a partially observable Markov de-
cision process to model the slow time-variable threat data, 
and the MDP solution provides a value or strategy for 
each state. The condition for such a solution is to keep an 
informed and complete view of the state. The partially 
observable Markov decision process (POMDP) just blurs 
the current state, which makes the existence of the uncer-
tainty of the current status dependent on the MDP choose 
action; the current state is thus not always effective. Alt-
hough the POMDP potential dynamic features still have 
Markov properties, since they are unable to obtain the 
current state directly, when they make decisions, the 
whole process of the history is required, so that they are 
considered non-Markov processes. At a certain point in 
time, there is an understanding of the beginning and the 
record of all actions and the values of all observations. 
Fortunately, when a probability distribution of all states is 
simply maintained, it is as if the entire history of the 
model is controlled. In the MDP, we track the current 
state and update the status after each action. However, 
this approach can only be an assumption, or an attempt, 
because it depends on the completely observable proper-
ty. In the POMDP, due to the partial observability, a 
probability distribution of the state has to be maintained. 
When the model is executed and the action is observed, 
the probability distribution has to be updated again. 
The POMDP can be solved by value iteration such as 
the MDP. However, as mentioned above, the POMDP 
strategy is the mapping between the reliability state and 
the action, unlike the mapping of the state and action in 
the MDP. Therefore, the optimal function of the MDP 
becomes the following: 
 
(4) 
B is the set of all possible reliability states. In the previ-
ous formula, the previously defined conversion function 
( , , )T s a s′ and the income function ( , , )R s a s′  are replaced 
with ( , , )b a bτ ′ and ( , )a bρ . This phenomenon is because 
in the POMDP, the state and decision makers cannot be 
known completely, so the conversion and reward func-
tions will be defined on the basis of the state of the relia-
bility b, rather similar to the MDP, which is based on a 
single state transformation function and reward function. 
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5 SUSTAINABLE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 
MECHANISM 
5.1 Overall Design 
To realize the secure resource management for RTAI-
Linux in industrial automation, a security domain based 
model is used as the authority to provide access control. 
Specifically, domain-type enforcement (DTE) access con-
trol is applied in the proposed secure resource manage-
ment mechanism. DTE takes the embedded system as a 
collection set of subjects and objects. Here, the subjects 
correspond to the attribute domains, and the objects cor-
respond to the attribute types. An operating authority 
table is established between the subject domain and the 
object types, based on which the access to the practical 
system is judged. The security policy contains a DTE gen-
eral access control policy and white list. There are many 
implementations for the access control system, such as the 
LSM-based general access control framework and the 
system call reloaded-based technology. However, the 
source codes of the system call need to be modified to 
realize the reloading, and the system call is one of the 
most important application programming interface (API) 
groups. This API group has poor portability and security, 
so the LSM general access control framework is adopted 
to establish the access control system. Moreover, the LSM 
has plenty of hook functions, which can provide most 
authority and access control requirements, such as the 
passing of process authority, file access, and socket ac-
cess. In the system design, the LSM-based general access 
control framework is used. Within the following specific 
design, the implementation of each subrequirement’s ac-
cess control will be described in detail. The details that 
are especially difficult to be address in the LSM are em-
phasized . Otherwise, to make the whole architecture of 
the access control system clearer, the Flask security archi-
tecture is referred to support more policies. The system 
design of the authority and access is shown in Fig. 6, 
which refer the Flask security architecture and use the 
Linux Security Module (LSM) general access control 
framework. Corresponding to the Flask security architec-
ture, the LSM hooks are equivalent to the object manager, 
which is shown in Fig. 6. Corresponding to the LSM ar-
chitecture, the security server in Fig. 6 is equivalent to the 
LSM's policy engine. To support the policy configuration 
and polling, an interactive program running in the user 
space is needed, which can be implemented as a user in-
terface. The security administrator can configure the secu-
rity policy with the program or poll the existing policy. 
The policy can be stored in two ways; in the user space, 
the policy is stored as a configuration file that is stored on 
the disk. To support policy polling by the kernel, the ac-
cessible policy database needs to be established in the 
kernel, which will be loaded in the memory. With a rea-
sonable data structure design, it can be accessed conven-
iently and efficiently. By referring to the Flask security 
architecture, an authorization and access control architec-
ture is proposed to support multiple security policies. In 
the proposed mechanism, there are two main kinds of 
security policy, a DTE security policy and the white list 
mechanism. 
The entire system in the thick dashed box shown in 
Fig. 6 is proposed to be implemented, and the three parts 
circled with a fine dotted line are the major parts, while 
the other parts that are not circled with a dotted line are 
the processes or interfaces in the operating system. 
Among these three main parts, the policy configuration 
and polling module provide the security administrator 
with the capabilities of policy management and polling. 
The security server module parses the security policy and 
the policy query requests of the corresponding hook func-
tion. Moreover, the object manager intercepts resource 
access requests and puts forward policy query requests to 
the security server. The system will be implemented as an 
independent kernel module with the Linux operating 
system, which is convenient for the upgrade and portabil-
ity of the Linux system. 
In RTAI-Linux, LSM is an important security module. 
Usually, LSM is loaded as the dynamic kernel module, 
and can only be loaded at the time of the system boot. 
Moreover, LSM just supports hooking the registrations 
and the loading of functions for one-time use, and the 
kernel is not allowed to dynamically uninstall the LSM 
hook. Because the Linux kernel itself has many limita-
tions, and the update of the hook function needs to modi-
fy the source code and recompile, it is impossible to re-
place or use multiple load hook functions dynamically.  
The design of the policy configuration and polling 
module, security server module and object manager 
module (LSM hooks) are described in the following. In 
Fig. 6, the thick dashed box denotes the entire system to 
be implemented. In the architecture, all the three parts 
circled with the fine dotted line are the three major com-
ponents, and others parts without the dotted line are the 
processes or interfaces in the operating system. Among 
the three main parts, the policy configuration and polling 
module provide the security administrator with the capa-
bilities of policy management and polling. The security 






























①：Policy configuration and 





Fig. 6. Overall design of secure resource management. 
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query requests of the corresponding hook functions. 
Moreover, the object manager intercepts resource access 
requests and can put forward the policy query requests to 
the security server. The system will be implemented as an 
independent kernel module with RTAI-Linux operating 
system, which is convenient for the upgrade and portabil-
ity of the Linux system. 
5.2 Policy Configuration and Polling 
All operating systems’ access control is based on the ac-
cess control attributes associated with the subject and the 
object. In the traditional DAC, the access control attrib-
utes of the subject are the uid and gid of the processes, 
and the access control properties of the object are the uid 
and gid to which the object belongs. The traditional access 
control attributes cannot satisfy the requirements in the 
proposed mechanism, so a security context is introduced 
to present more abundant access control attributes. The 
security context is a variable-length string, and the securi-
ty context is defined as the type. 
In fact, the security context and security identifier (SID) 
just borrow the concept of Flask to present the security-
related properties of the subject and the object. These 
properties are used as the flags of access control and can 
be defined according to the practical scenario, which 
Flask did not specify. In the proposed mechanism, the 
DTE access control model is mainly used. Thus, the type 
of the subject or object is taken as the security property, 
which is the Flask security context. The SID is the value of 
the security context and has the same meaning. Thus, we 
define the security context as type.. 
The policy configuration file: 
In the proposed secure resource management mecha-
nism, the subjects and objects are identified by the path 
and name. The industrial automation applications and 
services cannot be controlled when copied and run under 
another directory. To perform this mechanism, the ad-
ministrator needs to add the new security policy to the 
control. Similarly, neither the software nor hardware links 
of the subjects and objects can be controlled without the 
addition of the security policy. Multiple copies and links 
evaluations are not supported in either the application 
layer or the kernel layer, which needs the administrator to 
manually configure the security policy. 
Application policy configuration program: 
The user policy configuration program provides the in-
terface for security administrators to carry out policy poll-
ing and management. The policy configuration program 
runs in the user space, and its main processing flow is 
shown in Fig. 7.  
During the policy configuration procedure, the follow-
ing operations should be conducted. 1) The program re-
ceives user input information, which may include the 
type definition of new subject, object, mapping between 
subject or object and the type, and the access permissions 
definition for the subject to the object. This part can be 
implemented as a user interface, which is convenient for 
the security administrator; 2) After obtaining the input 
parameters, the user policy configuration program will 
map the security context, type, object class, and permis-
sions from the variable length string to the fixed length 
value according the predefined rules, considering the far 
higher efficiency of the numerical comparison than that of 
a string and less space during the kernel policy polling; 3) 
After mapping, the user policy configuration program 
will write the policy into the file based on the given for-
mat; 4) Finally, the policy update module of the configu-
ration program informs the kernel to update the policy 
database. The security server in the kernel incrementally 
updates the security rules to keep the synchronization of 
the policies in user space and kernel space. This operation 
will be implemented with the device file creation mecha-
nism of RTAI-Linux. 
5.3 Security Server 
The security server is mainly composed of the kernel pol-
icy database and four subfunction modules, including the 
initialization submodule, the policy update monitor sub-
module, the policy loading submodule and the policy 
polling submodule. The composition and the relation-
ships among the submodules are important issues for the 
proposed security mechanism, as is shown in Fig. 8. The 
policy configuration polling module and the object man-
agement module are also given in Fig. 8. The initialization 
module is responsible for the initialization of the security 
server. To update the kernel policy space in a timely 
manner and provide dynamic policy configuration, the 
policy update monitor module monitors the notification 
of the policy update from the policy configuration pro-
gram in the user space. Upon receiving a notification of a 
policy update, the policy loading module reads the policy 
file and loads the updated policies to the kernel policy 
database. Moreover, the access computing result module 
retrieves the policy database with the security attributes 
of the subject, security attributes of the object, object class 
and requested access methods. Additionally, the module 
returns the permission or rejection according to the policy 
database. The security server is a kernel module, and ker-
nel trust is a prerequisite in the proposed mechanism. 
Receives user 
input information
Mapping of type, 
security context, class 
and permission
Writes the policy into 
the file
 Informs the 









of type, security 








User policy configuration 
and polling
 
Fig. 7. Process flow of the application configuration file. 
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Therefore, the security server is also trusted and needs no 
integrity protection to avoid tampering. 
 
Two kinds of access control policies are supported in 
the proposed secure resource management mechanism, 
which are the DTE and the white list mechanism. When 
access requests are processed, the policy of the white list 
is retrieved first for the resources covered in the white list. 
Then, the DTE policy is retrieved. The resource access is 
permitted only if both security policies are passed. Oth-
erwise, the access will be rejected as being in violation of 
any policy. The process flow of the security server is 
shown in Fig. 8. 
Initialization: 
The main function of the initialization module is to ini-
tialize the entire security server. The initialization module 
can realize the following operations: initializing the policy 
database, emptying the default initialization policies, 
loading the policy configuration file as the default access 
control policy if there is an established policy, and regis-
tering the device file needed by the incremental policy 
update. 
Policy Incremental Update: 
Policy transfer needs to perform the updates of the pol-
icy. The dynamic policy update needs a mechanism to 
inform the kernel to incrementally update the policy da-
tabase of the security server in kernel layer when the user 
updates the policy through the policy configuration pro-
gram. The policy update monitor module in the kernel is 
responsible for receiving the message of the policy up-
date, which involves the interaction between the user 
space and kernel space. A virtual device is created to pro-
vide communications between the kernel module and the 
application of the upper layer. The virtual device driver 
does not care about the specific hardware device but ra-
ther aims to fulfil the data interaction between the kernel 
module and the application through various operating 
functions of the driver. A character device driver is pro-
grammed to realize various operating functions in the file 
operations structure, such as Open, Release, Read, and 
Write. Not all operating functions need to be developed in 
most of the device drivers. In the proposed mechanism, 
only the Write function needs to be implemented to pass 
the incremental policy update information generated by 
the application to the kernel module. According to the 
above information, the kernel will add, delete, or modify 
the corresponding policy. 
Policy Loading Module: 
The policy loading module converts the policy config-
uration file into a policy database in the kernel, which is 
not the security policy database of SELinux and needs to 
be developed. SELinux is not directly used in the pro-
posed mechanism, but some design ideas and methods 
drew on the design and implementation of SELinux. Be-
cause the kernel can read the file directly, the use of the 
policy configuration file for policy storage greatly simpli-
fies the process of transferring the policy to the kernel. 
The policy loading module mainly solves how to convert 
the configuration files into the defined policy database 
structure, that is, the process of policy parsing. The policy 
configuration files are read one by one, and the contents 
are loaded into the corresponding items of the policy da-
tabase structure. Self-protection measures are taken for 
the policy files. In other words, as the key resources, these 
files are also to be protected by the white list mechanism. 
Policy Polling Module: 
The policy polling module receives the formatted re-
quest from the object manager. There are two main kinds 
of requests. One kind of request is to query the class of 
the subject or the object. The corresponding table includes 
the subject-domain and object-class mapping table. The 
input is the name of the subject or the object, and the out-
put is the class of the subject or the object. Another kind 
of request is to query whether a subject is permitted to 
access a particular object. The corresponding table in-
cludes the white list and the access control table. Moreo-
ver, the input is the security attributes of the subject (sub-
ject name as white list, subject type as access control ta-
ble), the security attributes of the object (object name as 
white list, object class as access control list), object class, 
and access mode (the permissions of the access). The out-
put is then allowed or denied access.  
To improve the query efficiency, the Access Vector 
Cache (AVC) submodule is added in the policy polling 
module. This submodule can cache some decision results, 
which can effectively improve the query speed for a re-
quest at a particular time. 
The Policy Database in the Kernel: 
In a general linear table or tree, the relative position of 
a record in the structure is random and has no deter-
mined relationship with its keyword. Therefore, the rec-
ord lookup in structure needs a series of comparisons 
with the keyword. This kind of lookup is based on the 
comparison, and the lookup efficiency depends on the 
lookup time. The ideal case of this work is to find the rec-
ord directly. Therefore, a fixed relationship between the 
stored position of the record and its keyword must be 
established, which makes each keyword correspond to a 
unique memory position in the structure. 
As shown in Fig. 9, a hash table provides a different 
storage and lookup method from the general linear table, 
chain and search trees. The hash key value is directly 
mapped to a position in the table, where its correspond-





















Fig. 8. The process flow of the security server. 
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ing data elements are stored. When a lookup operation is 
performed, the address where the data elements are 
stored can be directly found according to the searched 
key value, and thus the data elements can be obtained. 
Different keywords may have the same hash address, that 
is, Key1≠Key2, and f(Key1) = f(Key2), and this is called a 
conflict.  
5.4 Object Manager Module 
The development of Object Manager/LSM hooks is to 
program corresponding hook functions for the hook 
points to be evaluated. From the perspective of function, 
LSM hooks can be classified into file hooks, socket hooks, 
program hooks, and some other hooks. The program 
hook is mainly used to control the multiple nested access 
of the module. The file hook mainly controls file-related 
access, and the socket hook mainly controls network ac-
cess. These three types of hooks are mostly used in the 
proposed mechanism. Because there are two kinds of pol-
icies, and the white list mechanism has a higher priority, 
the object manager first issues a white list query request 
to the security server, in which the subject name is the 
subject security attribute, the object name is the object 
security attribute, and the object class and access mode 
will be determined in the specific access. If the requested 
object is in the white list, that is, the access request is con-
trolled by the white list, a permission decision of the ac-
cess should be made according to the corresponding con-
trol policy. 
5.5 Task Scheduling Algorithm 
Assume that a set of independent tasks is denoted as 
S={s1, s2, …, sn}. To denote the secure management 
task      , multielement tuples are used, which are (T(si), 
L(si), Y(si), M(si), B(si), G(si)). Here, T(si) denotes the maxi-
mum running time, L(si) denotes the deadline of Task si, 
Y(si) denotes the response time of Task si, M(si) denotes the 
remaining time of si, B(si) denotes the elapsed time of si, 
and G(si) denotes the time of si occupied by a task with 
high priority. In addition, CurSt(si) denotes the current 
state of the task, including the running state, waiting 
state, blocked state, discarded state, finished state, etc. 
Definition 1: For real-time task si, if the security man-
agement policy                                 is used, the security 






where              denotes the number of Task pi calls to the 
security service.               denotes the time cost to realize 
service      , and                 denotes the security quality. ek 
denotes the weight of the security management service in 
the whole security system. If the value of ek increases, the 
impact of the current security service also increases. 
Definition 2: A schedulable task set is the real-time 
task set in the scheduled queue, which is denoted as Ssched. 
Definition 3: For the security management 
task                        , if the task is added into task set Ssched, 












































Fig. 9. The structures of the hash table. 
Performs updates for the scheduling data in Ssched.; 
   Switch case                                ; 
       if si is schedulable in Ssched then 
           CurSt(si)=Waited State; 
       else if                                       
           rejects each                                to the discarded 
queue; 
           CurSt(si)=Waited State; 
       else 
           report fault of key task; 
       end if 
       insert si to Ssched based on the order of its priority; 
   end case 
   case                      
       if si is schedulable in Ssched then 
           CurSt(si)=Waited State; 
           insert si to Ssched based on the order of its priority; 
       else 
           rejects s to the discarded queue; 
       end if 
   end case 
Return. 
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For real-time task si=S that is added into the task set 
Ssched, if the following Eq. (5) and Eq. (6) are satisfied, this 
task is schedulable in task set Ssched. 
 
(9) 
where                              denotes the task set whose pri-
ority is lower than the task si in Ssched. 
The core idea of the scheduling algorithm is to provide 
a security policy for new tasks joining the scheduled 
queue. The latest real-time task in the arrived queue will 
be obtained, and the corresponding processes will be giv-
en based on the task type. First, the algorithm is adjusted 
to ensure that the key tasks have satisfactory schedulabil-
ity. If the task is schedulable, it will be input into the 
scheduled queue. However, if a key task is not schedula-
ble, the normal tasks will give way for it. The algorithm is 
shown in Table 1. 
6 EVALUATIONS 
6.1 Security Capability Evaluation 
To implement the security evaluation for the proposed 
sustainable secure management mechanism, we perform 
two simulations. The first simulation is to use the tradi-
tional security data set to perform the evaluation, and the 
second simulation is to simulate an APT and evaluate the 
defense capability of the proposed mechanism. To im-
plement comparisons, the mechanism in [35] is intro-
duced. 
First, the data set DARPA Intrusion Detection Evalua-
tion Data for is used for testing and training. Nine weeks 
of network-based attacks of general background data are 
used for the training. To keep the universality of the data, 
the middle data of the general background data are ap-
plied. The evaluations of the defense capabilities of the 
proposed secure management mechanism are shown in  
Fig. 10. The vertical axis in Fig. 10 denotes the threat 
detection rate. Moreover, nine kinds of threats are taken 
as the example from the DARPA Intrusion Detection 
Evaluation Data, which are denoted as a number of 
groups of columns. As illustrated in Fig. 10, the threat 
detection rate of the proposed mechanism is much higher 
than that of the mechanism in [35] 
In addition, an attack experiment was performed on a 
prototype system with two intelligent embedded systems. 
One machine acted as a server node, and the second ma-
chine was deployed to generate legitimate and hostile 
access attempts. As illustrated in Fig. 11, the threat detec-
tion rate of the proposed mechanism is higher than that of 
the mechanism in [35], and the increment is 11 percent 
points on average. 
Next, we simulate an APT attack on an intelligent em-
bedded system. The attack principle is based on Stuxnet. 
We evaluate the error of the APT feature discovery. To 
avoid the negative effects of the large span of the original 
data, the security factor data are standardized for extre-
ma. For the original data D=(d1, d2, …, dk), the extremum 




6.2 Time Overhead Evaluation 
To evaluate the time overhead of the proposed sus-
 
Fig. 11. Security evaluation-based traditional threat experiment. 
 
Fig. 10. Security evaluation based on traditional threat data sets. 
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tainable secure management mechanism, a test is per-
formed on the system based on an environments using 
Ubuntu 11.04 and TRAI 3.8.1 with an Intel Core 2 Duo 
T6570 CPU with 4 GB RAM. The time overhead is shown 
in Fig. 13.  The time overhead is acceptable. 
7 CONCLUSION 
When an APT is present in smart manufacturing, the tra-
ditional secure defense components are no longer in 
force, because of the concealment, latency and longterm 
entanglement. This paper proposes a novel and sustaina-
ble secure management mechanism that can perform sus-
tainable threat intelligence analysis and continuous se-
cure resource management. The proposed mechanism is 
significant to improve the security of smart manufactur-
ing. Edge artificial intelligence is a novel technology, 
which provides a feasible way to realize efficient defense 
at the edge of smart manufacturing. In the future, we will 
aim to propose edge artificial intelligence based defense 
approach to enhance the security capability of smart 
manufacturing. 
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